In this paper we determine routing polices for a data transmission network that are robust with respect to attempts of packet interception by an adversary. This problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between the designer of the routing algorithm and an adversary that attempts to intersect packets. We show that for some versions of the game, the optimal routing policies also maximize the throughput between the source to the destination node. In this paper we also list problems in this area that remain open.
Introduction
In modern networking, game theory has been used to investigate flow control [I], [2] , allocation of link capacities [3], server allocation [4], the trade-off between delay and throughput along virtual circuits [5] , [SI, [7] , competitive routing, where multiple users are sharing the network and each is trying to minimize the flow cost [SI. However, there has been little work on secure routing where packets are under threat of being corrupted or filtered by an attacker. For example, an attacker may have the ability to "sniff" packets along a particular link and watch for passwords or other information traversing the link.
In this paper we are interested in determining routing policies for the network that are robust with respect to attempts of packet interception by an adversary. To this effect, we will formalize routing design as a game between two players: an adversary that attempts to intersect packets and the designer of the routing algorithm that tries to avoid packets from crossing the links that are under the attackers surveillance. This game is investigated under different rules and information structures. In some cases, the game reduces to the well known max flow problem for which there exists computationally efficient algorithms.
We consider a data transmission network with nodes N := { 1,2,. . . ,n} connected by unidirectional links.
We denote by C the set of all links and use the notation 32 to represent a link from node j to node i. For link t? E L we denote by re the time it takes for a packet to transverse that link and by be the link's bandwidth in packets per second, where the packets are assumed to be of uniform size. We assume here that all the nodes in the network are connected in the sense that it is possible to reach any node from any other node through a finite sequence of links.
By a routing policy for a network it is usually meant an algorithm that determines which sequence of links {zs,zx,. . . , z s } c C should be used to direct (route) a packet from a source node il E N to a destination node ik € hf. Without loss of generality, we take the source and destinations nodes to be 1 and n, respectively. Because of this we do not need to consider links coming out of node n and for simplicity we will assume that no link in L exits node n. Most routing policies used in data transmission network have no memory in the sense that, when a packet arrives at some node i E N with final destination ik E N , the routing algorithms selects a path from i to ik independently of where the packet is coming from. Here, we will not restrict our attention solely to this class of routing algorithms. In particular, some of the policies considered will take into account the node where the packets started (by convention node 1).
In the next section the max flow problem is posed in an uncommon setting. Then, different types of games are investigated. The first is an on-line game where the attacker has full information and is able to attack a new link at every step. This game is solved with dynamic programming. The second game is off-line, where the attacker must choose one link to attack at the beginning of the game. The routing algorithm is designed to minimize the effect of the attack. In some cases, these games reduces to the max flow problem of Section 2. Finally, the routing algorithm is adjusted in order to not only minimize the effect of the attack, but also reduce the delay (e.g. number of hops). This problem will reduce to the max flow with gain problem Before formalizing the routing problem we derive some basic results on the maximum number of packets per second that can flow in a network without violating the bandwidth constraints.
Maximum Throughput
Suppose that we want to compute the maximum number of packets per second that can be transferred between two nodes in the network without drops. Without loss of generality, we take the source and destinations nodes to be 1 and n, respectively, and we denote by xe the number of packets per second that transverses link e E L. Each xt must be in the interval [0, be] .
In this section, we consider routing policies that distribute packets among several possible alternative paths according to a rule defined in terms of the percentage of packages sent through each path. Here, we take as given a routing policy that enforces that r s percent of all the packets arriving at node i are routed through link E C. We ignore the quantization and assume that this percentage is exact at all times. Policies of this type are called deterministic multi-path routing policies. We denote by Rdet the set of all such policies. As far as the traffic flow is concerned, each deterministic routing policy is characterized by the list R := {re : I E Is}, where the re satisfy
In the sequel, we actually equate Rdet to the set of lists R with the above property. The maximum number of packets per second that can be transferred without drops by a deterministic multi-path routing policy R := {re : e E E } is called the maximum throughput of R.
Assuming that p packets per second are sent from node 1 to n without drops, we must have
where 6ij := 1 when i = j and 6ij := 0 otherwise. Equation (1) can also' be written as 
Maximum Bandwidth
The maximum throughput computed above depends on the routing policy R. One can also pose the question, given a routing policy, what is the m a x i " throughput attainable? We call this throughput the muximum bandwidth of the network between nodes 1 and n.
Assuming that p packets per second are sent from node 1 to n without drops, we must have Equation ( 3 Routing Games Take the routing problem as a game between the network designer that specifies the routing algorithm and an adversary that attempt to intercept data in the network. We consider here a zero-sum game in which the designer wants to minimize the time it takes for a packet to be sent from node 1 to node n, and the adversary wants to maximize this time. To accomplish this, the adversary attempts to intercept the packet at particular links in the network. For short we say that the adversary scans link e E L when she attempts to intercept the packet at that link. Several versions of the game are possible depending on how the game is defined:
link to be scanned only once before the packet is sent out of node 1, or she can select a new link every time the packet arrives at a new node. In the latter case, we assume that she knows where the packet is when she makes her selection.
ERectiveness
In case the adversary scans a link over which the packet is traveling, the probability that she wiU intercept the packet maybe smaller than 1, i.e., she may not produce any effect on the routing of the packet with some nonzero probability. This probability may be fixed or it may vary from link to link. Effectiveness can account for defenses such as camouflaging packets amongst decoy packets, were the attacker can only intercept a fraction of all packets send.
Delay V.S. resend In case the adversary intercepts the packet, it may just suffer an additional delay (or cost) and proceed from the same node after that, or it can be sent back to node 1 after some delay (time-out). In this paper we assume that the interception is done at the links but similar results can be derived when the interception occurs at the nodes.
OnlineGame
We start by considering an on-line game in which the adversary selects a new linlr to be scanned every time the packet arrives at a new node and makes the selection knowing where the packet is. For generality, we take the probability of intercepting a packet to be link dependent and denote by pe the probability of intercepting a packet traveling in link e E t, given that link C is being scanned by the adversary. Here, we will assume that there are no drops. We start by considering the case in which intercepting a packet simply results in a fixed2 extra delay T . The routing of the packet over the network can then be regarded as a stationary Markov chain whose state qt E N is a random variable denoting the node where the packet is before the hop t E (1, 2,. . . }. Denoting by at E L the next link as determined by the routing algorithms and by bt E L the link scanned by the adversary, we have the following transition probability function for the Markov chain
state n is an absorbing state, i.e., P(qt+l = q' I qt = n, at = e,, bt = e,) = 6qln, q' E N , el,e2 E L, t E {1,2,. . .}. The cost to be optimized is the average time it takes to send the package from node 1 to node n and can be written as SSP 1 There exists at least one proper policy for the minimizer, i.e., a policy that will lead to a finite cost regardless of the policy chosen by the maximizer. This is true because we assume that there exists a sequence of link that connects node 1 to node n. Note that even considering the version of the game in which an intercepted packet is sent back to node 1, this assumption holds provided that pe < 1 for every C E C, because the packet w i l l eventually reach the destination with proba--bility one.
SSP 2 For any policies for which there is a zero probability that the packet will reach the destination node, the corresponding cost is infinite. This is true provided that rt > 0 for every L E L, because all links that do not reach node n will contribute to the final cost with a positive marginal cost.
To find a saddle solution to the game defined above, let us denote by vl,, i E N, the wst-to-go from node i, defined to be the average time it takes to send a packet from node i to node n using optimal routing policies for each player. Because we are dealing with a stationary Markov chain and an infinite horizon cost, starting the summation at time k = 1 is completely arbitrary. Clearly, V, = 0. Suppose now that a packet just arrived at node i E N\ {n}, the designer decides to route it through the link 3 E C and the adversary decides to scan link C E E. For these particular choices, the average cost will be 
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The infha and suprema in (11)- (12) Now consider the case in which an intercepted packet is sent back to node 1 after a delay T , the transition probability for the Markov chain in (7) becomes
The cost in (9) must then be replaced by
and, therefore, the matrix n/r,[V] must be replaced by However, all the assumptions mentioned before still hold and Theorem 2 is also true for this version of the game. Remark 3. When the intercepted packet is sent back to the source node, the cost-tego vi (and therefore the optimal routing policy) depends on the source node (chosen to be 1 in this derivation). This does not happen when interception just introduces an extra delay.
Off-line Game
Now we consider an offline game in which the adversary selects which link to be scanned before routing starts, but the player responsible for designing the routing policy does not know which link was selected. is nothing she can do with this information) and therefore a solution to this game that avoids the combmatorial explosion by making use of dynamic programming seems possible. Unfortunately, even with nested information, solving this game seems computationally hard because of partial information. In search for solutions to the game that are computationally more attractive, we start by considering a simpler version of the game in which the cost that defines the zero-sum game is simply
where x is a random variable that is equal to 1 if the packet is intercepted and 0 otherwise. This cost assumes that all paths are equal and therefore all that matters is to make sure that the packet reaches its destination. This can be viewed as the limiting case when a packet being intercepted means that it nill suffer a fixed extra delay T that is much larger than any of the delays re, e E C, incurred when the packet is not caught. We consider here stochastic routing policies and denote by Rsto this class of policies. Under such policies, whenever a packet arrives at node k E .,I-. it will be routed through link E L with probability r~. AS far as the routing is concerned, each routing pohcy is characterized by the list R := {rl : e E C}. where the re satisfy
In the sequel we equate Rst, to the set of lists R with the above prop&ty.
Let us consider a fixed routing policy R := {re : I E L} E %to and a choice of link I E L to be scanned by the adversary. The corresponding cost J m is then given by JRe = Pm(x = I), where the subscript R ( in the probability measure emphasizes its dependency on the choices of both players. Since all we are interested in is determining if the packet is caught (in which case x = l), without loss of generality we can assume that, once a packet is caught it will not be routed anymore. Under this assumption, denoting by x&) the probability that the packet will be sent to link I E L f o + r the hop t E {1,2 ,...} , w e h a v e t h a t f o r t > l m d z k E L , zs(1) = r~, z~( t + 1 ) = r z ( 1 -p P e b t p ) z j : ( t ) .
(13)
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Using the fact that the conditional probability that a packet is caught in the tth hop, given that it was sent to link l in that hop, is equal to pel we can then write the cost as Jm = pexe(t). Equation (13) can also be written as
where x ( t ) := {xe(t) : C E L}, t 2 1, Pe is a matrix whose entries are all zero except for the eth diagonal element that is equal to pi, and AR and CR are as in Section 2.1. The probability of the packet being intersected can then be written as Since the cost is not bilinear on the policies, it is not clear if a saddle solution does exist. We conjecture that it does but leave this issue for a future paper. Here,
we will seek for a security policy R* for the player that designs the routing policy. defined by
The policy R ' policy is m M 3.2.1 Cycle-free Routing: To solve (16), we restricting ourselves to stochastic cycle-fRe routing policies. These are stochastic routing policies for which R := {rt : e E L} is chosen so that a packet will not return to a node where it has been before with probabilitv one. Formallv, this means that there is no se- and therefore where p R denotes the maximum throughput defined by (3), when all links have bandwidths be, e E L, equal to b. Security policies for this game can then be computed using the h e a r program defined in Theorem 1, provided that one selects an optimal policy R* that is cycle-free. Note that the optimal policy R* in Theorem 1 should now be interpreted as a stochastic cycle-free routing policy.
Bias Towards Short Paths:
In the previous sections we considered a cost J = E[x] that ignores the length of the path taken. We show here how this cost can be modified to bias the routing towards short paths and still keeping the computations simple.
The cost proposed is defined by J, := E[xJ where x,, E 2 0, is a random variable that is equal to (1 + E )~-~ if the packet is intercepted at the tth hop and 0 otherwise. For E = 0, this random variable degenerates in the random variable x defined before. This new cost function bias the solution sought by the player that designs the routing policy towards shorter paths since, when being caught is inevitable, it incurs in less cost if it is caught sooner than later. In fact, as E 4 00, the burden of an extra hop is so large that the optimal solution will minimize the number of hops.
It turns out that solving the game for the new cost J, is conceptually the same as solving the game for the previous cost J . To see why this is so, let us expand J,
Here we have used (14). This means that this new game can be solved similarly to the previous ones, provided that we replace AR by (1 + E)AR.
Remark 4.
For the case of no cycles, the solution to this game corresponds to a flow constrain of the form z = (1 + E)ARZ -t p C R , instead of (2). This can be view as a multiplicative flow amplification of (1 + E ) at each node and it will make input flows that use many hops smaller because they are more amplified as they travel to the destination node. 4 
Conclusions
In this paper we determined routing polices for a data transmission network that are robust with respect to attempts of packet interception by an adversary. This problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between the designer of the routing algorithm and an adversary that attempts to intersect packets. We show that for some versions of the game, the optimal routing policies also maximize the bandwidth between the source to the destination node.
Several problems remain open. For online games, numerical computations seem to indicate that policy iteration seems to converge to a fixed point in a finite number of steps. We have also observed that the optimal policies computed numerically are cycle-fie. We are now investigating if these are general properties of these games. This seems to be so, at least, for the case when interception just introduces an extra delay. For o&e game, we have so far only computed security policies that are worst case solutions for the player that designs the routing policies. We believe that the solutions that we derived are actually saddle solutions but that remains to be proved. Finally, so far we restricted our attention to cyclefree policies for the of3ine game. It remains to investigate if policies with cycles can yield more favorable costs.
